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A B S T R A C T   
Medical leaders occupy a prominent position in healthcare policy in many countries, both in terms of the 
governance of quality and safety within healthcare organisations, and in broader system-wide governance. There 
is evidence that having doctors on hospital boards is associated with higher quality services. What is not known is 
how they have this effect. Analysing data collected from observations, interviews and documents from 15 
healthcare providers in England (2014–2019), we elaborate the role of medical directors in healthcare gover-
nance as ‘translation work’, ‘diplomatic work’, and ‘repair work’. Our study highlights the often enduring 
emotional effects of repeated structural changes to clinical services. It also contributes to theories of professional 
restratification, showing the work of medical directors as regional ‘political elites’, and as ‘corporate elites’ in 
publicly-funded healthcare systems.   
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In many high income countries healthcare policy allocates ‘medical 
leaders’ a prominent role, both in terms of the governance of quality and 
safety within healthcare organisations, and in broader system-wide 
governance. There is evidence that medical leadership is associated 
with healthcare quality (Clay-Williams et al., 2017). Research from the 
US has found positive relationships between medical involvement on 
boards and both financial and service quality outcomes (Molinari et al., 
1995; Prybil 2006; Goodall 2011). Similarly, a study from the NHS in 
England found a significant positive association between the proportion 
of doctors on the board and the quality of the service provided by the 
organisation (Veronesi et al., 2013). It is not known how doctors on the 
board have this effect, although it has been suggested that positive ef-
fects are down to doctors’ knowledge in relation to the ‘core business’ of 
the organisation, which may help with decision-making and strategy 
(Goodall 2011), and the potential for medical leaders to engage doctors 
at all levels in quality improvement initiatives (Weiner et al., 1997). 
This paper explores the work of Medical Directors in healthcare 
governance. While the term ‘governance’ has been used to refer to the 
workings of inter-organisational networks (Rhodes 1996) we use it in its 
broader sense, following Bevir: 
Governance refers to all processes of governing, whether undertaken 
by a government, market or network; whether over a family, tribe, 
corporation, or territory; and whether by norms, power, or language. 
Governance is a broader term than government because it focuses not 
only on the state and its institutions but also on the creation of rule and 
order in social practices. (Bevir, 2013, pi). 
An analytical perspective that captures the interactions between 
multiple actors and arenas, and both formal and informal processes, 
provides a fuller and richer understanding of the way welfare services 
are governed in the 21st century. Our focus here is on the everyday 
activities and interactions of Medical Directors, looking in particular at 
‘translation work’, ‘diplomatic work’, and ‘repair work’. 
1. Background 
Medical Directors form part of the senior management team at the 
apex of a healthcare organisation. Healthcare organisations are char-
acterised by the intellectual nature of the primary tasks with control 
exercised through training and standardisation (Fitzgerald et al., 2013). 
They are inherently pluralistic with divergent objectives and distributed 
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power (Denis et al., 2001). Public-sector healthcare providers, in the UK, 
and elsewhere, contain different belief systems, both managerial and 
professional, that coexist and at times conflict (Degeling et al., 2001). 
The NHS in England is further characterised by an organisational and 
political context that is resource constrained, turbulent, and highly 
policy dependent (Kislov et al., 2016). Healthcare services are often 
provided not by a single organisation, but by networks of organisations 
(Osborne et al., 2013), necessitating planning at a regional level, and 
coordination of a range of stakeholders. 
In policy and organisational strategy clinical leaders are seen as 
essential for ‘making change happen’ (Ferlie 2016). In recent years 
‘leading service change’ has also been recognised by the medical pro-
fession as a core role for doctors and incorporated into accounts of 
medical professionalism (Royal College of Physicians 2018). Service 
change is an enduring feature of the healthcare field, driven in part by 
technological developments (Straus et al., 1985). The current ubiquity 
of service change is often attributed to the influence of managerial ideas, 
values and techniques that spread throughout the health systems of high 
income countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferlie et al., 2016). In En-
gland, local healthcare organisations have faced sustained policy pres-
sure to reorganise services to improve efficiency and outcomes 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2013). While some change programmes are introduced 
in a single hospital, many are introduced by regional planners and are 
aimed at rationalisation or redesign of clinical services across multiple 
organisations (Jones and Exworthy, 2016). A similar policy context for 
healthcare organisations is evident in other countries (World Health 
Organization, 2018; Denis and Van Gestel, 2016; Lega and Sartirana, 
2016; Rotar et al., 2016). 
Sociological scholarship has positioned Medical Directors within the 
restratification of the profession (Friedson 1985; Waring 2014). Fried-
son’s (1985) thesis was that the emergence of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘administrative’ elites in the medical profession could be understood as a 
strategic response to new forms of bureaucratic control in the work-
place. Restratification served to maintain collective power and auton-
omy in the face of increasing bureaucratisation of professional work. 
While knowledge elites, such as those employed in the production of 
academic research and clinical standards, maintained professional 
control over the content of work, administrative elites, involved in 
planning and supervising the work of their rank and file colleagues, 
served to retain control over the organisational context of professional 
work. 
More recently Waring (2014) has updated and extended Friedson’s 
categories, to encompass political elites, knowledge elites, corporate elites, 
managerial elites, governance elites, and practice elites. In Waring’s anal-
ysis, Medical Directors are a form of ‘managerial elite’, an evolution of 
Friedson’s ‘administrative elites’, ‘reflecting the widespread and 
pervasive influence of management theories, ideologies, and practices in 
the contemporary organisation of expert work’ (2014, p700). According 
to Waring, ‘in contemporary public discourse, managerial elites are also 
those defined as ‘leaders’ and often presented as transforming profes-
sional services in the absence of ‘management’ (2014, p700). Waring’s 
analysis echoes Martin and Learmonth’s (2012) account of a discursive 
shift, over the previous 15 years, from ‘administration’ to ‘management’ 
to ‘leadership’. At the same time the term ‘leadership’ has been applied 
to increasingly heterogenous actors. Martin and Learmonth suggest that 
the contemporary emphasis on ‘clinical leaders’ in policy discourse can 
be understood as an effort to reconstitute professional subjectivities, ‘a 
co-optive means of ‘governing at a distance’ that complements more 
coercive modes of rule such as performance management’ (Martin and 
Learmonth 2012, p283). 
Professional-managerial ‘hybrids’ bring together what are often seen 
as contradictory logics, for example, a professional concern with quality 
and humanity with a managerial concern for efficiency and profitability. 
Empirical studies in organisational contexts have produced a range of 
different accounts of the development, and response to, professional- 
managerial hybrids, including managerial control of the profession; 
co-optation; strategic adaptation; and professional opposition (Numer-
ato et al., 2012). McGivern et al. (2015) distinguish between pro-
fessionals who take on hybrid roles reluctantly and those who do so 
willingly. ‘Incidental hybrids’ take on a hybrid identity temporarily, 
through a sense of obligation, maintaining traditional professional 
norms. They use their position to protect or ‘buffer’ (Friedson, 1994) 
professional colleagues from managerial intrusion. In contrast, ‘willing 
hybrids’ take on a permanent hybrid identity. Willing hybrids use their 
position to challenge what they see as ‘outdated professionalism’ and 
promote a hybrid professionalism aligned with their hybrid identity and 
their managerialist healthcare context. In McGivern et al.‘s sample, 
mid-level Clinical Directors were more likely to be ‘incidental hybrids’ 
while board-level Medical Directors tended to be ‘willing hybrids’. 
Recently Noordegraaf (2015) has argued that changes in the societal 
and organisational context of medical work have resulted in professional 
identities that have moved ‘beyond hybridisation’. Medical pro-
fessionals must now implement innovation, cooperate with other team 
members, and, as their careers progress, develop services with strategic 
and budgetary constraints in mind, all the while accounting to external 
stakeholders. In the process, ‘organizing’ has become an integral and 
‘natural’ part of professional action and professional identity. Others 
have suggested that it is the very ‘naturalness’ of this professional 
identity that makes it a potentially effective conduit for government. 
Martin and Learmonth (2012), for example, suggest that it is partly 
through these new subjectivities of ‘clinical leaders’ that governmental 
objectives are accomplished. 
While there has been considerable empirical and conceptual research 
on professional-managerial hybrids, this has, to date, focused on lower 
tiers of hospital management, and on the implications for professional 
autonomy and influence. There has been very little research on board- 
level hybrids and their role in policy implementation, service change, 
and quality improvement. In addressing this gap we ask, what forms of 
work do Medical Directors do, both within and outwith their organisa-
tion? What forms of interaction and connectivity are established with (a) 
other doctors, (b) other professionals, and (c) external stakeholders e.g. 
patient groups, commissioners and representatives of regulators and the 
NHS hierarchy? 
1.1. Approach 
Our approach draws on the sociological literature on work (Strauss 
et al., 1985; Bechky 2011). Sociological studies of work involve a close 
analysis of the actions, interactions and negotiations amongst social 
actors, focusing on what actually happens in real-world settings. This 
approach views action as relational and embedded in social networks 
(Crossley 2011). The implications for methods is a focus on the mate-
riality and language of work, ‘engaging in direct encounters with orga-
nisations by watching how people do what they do and listening to what 
they say about what they do’ (Bechky 2011, p 1162). 
We ground our analysis in data collected as part of a mixed methods 
study of the governance of quality improvement in hospitals undertaken 
between March 2014 and January 2019 (Jones et al., 2017). The 
research initially involved 60 h of observation of hospital board meet-
ings in 15 organisations (12 acute care providers, 2 mental health pro-
viders and 1 community care provider), and 70 in-depth interviews with 
members of the senior management team, such as Chief Executives (4), 
chairs (4), Medical Directors (6), Directors of Nursing (6), Executive 
Directors (7) and Non-Executive Directors (9). We also interviewed two 
Associate Medical Directors, two Clinical Directors, and two leads for 
quality improvement. Participants were interviewed in 2014 and again 
in 2015 or 2016 (if still in post). We also analysed a range of documents, 
including annual reports, performance reports, strategy documents, re-
ports prepared for external regulators, and meeting papers for executive 
board meetings, internal committee meetings, and regional planning 
meetings. 
Our initial analysis developed a measure of quality improvement 
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maturity and compared the characteristics of organisations with a ‘high’ 
quality improvement maturity with those with a ‘low’ quality 
improvement maturity (Jones et al., 2017). We found that a key dif-
ference related to the activities of board-level clinical leaders. We 
therefore extended the research to include a period of time spent 
shadowing a Medical Director in an organisation with high quality 
improvement maturity (60 h). The shadowing element of the research 
enabled us to explore our initial findings in greater depth, and to 
compare the findings from the shadowing element with those from the 
broader study. 
LJ shadowed the Medical Director on various occasions between 
December 2017 and August 2018, with a follow up visit in January 
2019. Shadowing has been used previously to understand the way chief 
executives in NHS organisations find and use knowledge (Nicolini et al., 
2014). Opportunities for shadowing were suggested by the Medical Di-
rector and included hospital board meetings, internal meetings, regional 
planning meetings, meetings with external agencies, and an internal 
organisation-wide quality improvement conference. There were also 
informal events and social occasions, such as coffee, lunch, and a party 
for a member of staff who was leaving the organisation. In addition to 
observation, the shadowing element included informal conversations 
and three formal interviews (one at the beginning of fieldwork, one at 
the end, and one six months after completion). As with the Nicolini et al. 
(2014) study, there was also a feedback session, at the request of the 
Medical Director, to enable him to use the experience as a development 
opportunity. 
In the sociological tradition of ‘policy ethnography’ (Griffiths and 
Hughes 2000) fieldwork involved arriving early, leaving late, and 
generally ‘hanging around’. The aim was to glean a more rounded pic-
ture of the work of the Medical Director by including chance encounters 
with a range of social actors and access to informal arenas for interac-
tion. In total, the data set we draw on relates to 40 Medical Directors 
across 37 healthcare organisations in England. 
The aim of analysis was to develop theoretical connections, groun-
ded in observation of individual action of people in an organisational 
context and showing how effects are produced (Hedström and Swed-
berg, 1996). We followed the recommendations of Timmermans and 
Tavory (2012) for fostering abductive analysis, revisiting the data on 
several occasions, attempting to ‘defamiliarise’ what might otherwise be 
taken for granted, and considering the phenomena in the light of existing 
theoretical accounts. Analysis was facilitated by taking detailed field-
notes, recording and transcribing interviews, coding, and writing 
analytical memos. By ‘coding’ we mean marking incidents of data we 
thought might be relevant to our emerging interpretative categories 
(Becker and Greer 1960). Fieldnotes were written by hand in notebooks 
at the time of observation or shortly after informal conversations and 
social events. 
Analysis was led by the first author and was prospective and 
continuous. LJ wrote analytical memos during fieldwork and while 
reading through transcripts and fieldnotes. These memos were expanded 
and refined following discussion with the second author and further data 
collection. The developing theoretical account was shaped by our 
existing knowledge of potentially relevant social science literature, 
additional reading, discussions with other scholars, and feedback from 
conference presentations. 
The inspiration for the key analytical categories of ‘translation work’, 
‘diplomatic work’ and ‘repair work’ was Straus et al.‘s (1985) conceptual 
elaboration of the different types of work entailed in the illness trajec-
tory of a patient, such as the ‘articulation work’ required to coordinate 
tasks carried out by different types of worker. The descriptors were 
selected from everyday English-language vocabulary, to capture our 
interpretation of what the actors in our study were accomplishing in 
their everyday work, how this contributed to corporate objectives, such 
as service change, and how this was facilitated by actors’ ‘hybrid’ status 
as both managers and doctors. 
The category of ‘translation work’ was developed during the first 
stage of research, across all 15 organisations (Jones et al., 2017). The 
shadowing element enabled us to confirm and extended this category, 
and to generate the additional categories of ‘diplomatic work’ and 
‘repair work’, which were then considered and refined against data 
collected from the broader study. An opportunity for member validation 
arose when we were invited to present the research at a workshop hosted 
by the UK Faculty of Medical Leadership and Management as part of 
their 2020 annual conference. The workshop was attended by 12 Med-
ical Directors and all responses from participants indicated that the 
findings resonated with their experience. 
Ethical approval was obtained from UCL Research Ethics Committee. 
The study received exemption from NHS Research Ethics processes. 
Informed consent for interviews was obtained from all participants. We 
have anonymised the organisations in the study and use a pseudonym 
(Stephen) for the Medical Director who agreed to be shadowed. 
1.2. Translation work 
In organisations with a ‘high’ quality improvement maturity, Medi-
cal Directors translated between domains and forms of knowledge. One 
location of this translation work was the monthly meeting of the board. 
Hospital boards typically have between 10 and 15 members, made up of 
executive and non-executive directors. Overall leadership resides with 
the chair. The Chief Executive leads the executive team with each 
member usually responsible for a specific function such as ‘finance’ or 
‘human resources.’ Non-executive directors are charged with holding 
the executive team to account. Executives and non-executives are ex-
pected to work together to develop organisational strategy (Chambers 
et al., 2013). 
Board meetings are characterised by a large volume of meeting pa-
pers, often running to hundreds of pages, containing data on financial 
performance and quality and safety in the organisation. These data are 
routinely collected, analysed, summarised in graphs, and collated in 
reports that are then circulated to board members. In organisations rated 
‘high’ in terms of quality improvement maturity, the Medical Director 
would translate data for other members of the senior management team, 
both in written narratives at the beginning of reports, and verbally 
during meetings. Drawing on their medical training, or on additional 
training in quality improvement undertaken as part of continuing pro-
fessional development, they would draw attention to any significant 
trends. From their knowledge and experience of front-line clinical work, 
and their communication with clinical staff on the wards, they would 
contribute additional analysis, identifying causes and consequences, and 
suggesting remedial courses of action. For example, during one board 
meeting Stephen presented a report of a mortality review (a process of 
establishing and monitoring numbers of inpatient deaths). He explained 
to the board the technical practice of risk adjustment and gave guidance 
on how to interpret the data. 
Medical Directors also translated findings from recent research and 
academic papers. For example, during one meeting Stephen advised the 
board on the relative benefits of different measures of mortality, refer-
ring to papers written by clinical academics and published in the British 
Medical Journal. During board meetings, and other occasions, such as 
internal meetings and seminars, Medical Directors would also interpret 
developments in national healthcare policy, and the activities of various 
external agencies, distilling the implications for the organisation and for 
the work of front-line staff. At times this translation work could be quite 
literal, as a chair of the board of the hospital where Stephen worked 
admitted. The chair came from the financial sector. He described how 
during meetings Stephen would sit next to him, lean over and whisper in 
his ear, explaining healthcare acronyms and who people were when 
their names came up in discussions. 
In contrast, in organisations with a ‘low’ quality improvement 
maturity, this translation work was often missing, as when there was no 
Medical Director in post, or withheld. For example, in one organisation a 
Medical Director appeared, during observation of board meetings, to be 
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primarily concerned with verbal ‘sparring’ with the chair, and putting a 
‘positive spin’ on data that related to a service development programme 
he was overseeing in the organisation. Another Medical Director pro-
vided graphs with no explanation of how to interpret them, and 
appeared hostile and uncommunicative during meetings, both in verbal 
and non-verbal forms of communication. The following is from 
fieldnotes: 
The chair asked a question about a graph of mortality statistics where 
it appeared to look worse in January. There was a pause and then the 
Medical Director said (in a tone of voice that might be interpreted as 
hostile or condescending) only ‘regression to the mean’. The Medical 
Director was seated side-on to the table and did not look directly to 
the chair when he spoke. There was then another long pause. The 
Medical Director offered no further information and the chair 
appeared unsure how to respond. This interaction appeared to me to 
be unhelpful (in helping the board to understand). Finally the 
Medical Director elaborated with ‘you can see a little trend here or 
there but they are single numbers with of no statistical significance’. 
(March 2016). 
1.3. Diplomatic work 
Much of Stephen’s day-to-day work involved what we term here 
‘diplomatic work’. This involved sensitive and tactful dealings with 
doctors at different levels of the organisation informed by knowledge of 
professional norms, cultural differences between specialties and pro-
fessional groups, and routine working practices. To illustrate, one day 
Stephen’s work was dominated by complaints from medical staff about 
the introduction of an electronic sepsis alert tool. Sepsis is currently the 
focus of a number of national and local quality improvement initiatives, 
including the introduction of tools that are added to electronic patient 
record systems to alert staff to a potential sepsis diagnosis. On this day 
the introduction of the alert to existing work flows had caused, as Ste-
phen described it, ‘massive upset’. According to Stephen, it had been 
introduced by a manger without a clinical background who did not 
understand the politics. Stephen went on to explain that sepsis was a 
contested diagnostic category among medical staff. While some spe-
cialties, such as Accident and Emergency and Intensive Care, recognise it 
as a distinct diagnosis, other specialties understand the phenomena as 
the deterioration of a patient with an underlying infection. The non- 
clinical manager had also failed to understand professional norms, 
such as the importance of clinical autonomy, and of maintaining control 
over how their work was ‘described, defined, sequenced, valued and 
evaluated’ (Degeling et al., 2011): 
People got upset here about the sepsis alert, that caused more angst 
because it’s a bit irritating but also because, interesting, it was 
perceived differently by different groups. So A&E don’t mind. A&E 
believe in sepsis. The medical teams don’t really believe in sepsis. 
They think it is a concept being imposed on them by A&E and 
intensive care and that’s not the proper diagnosis because the proper 
diagnosis is pneumonia or whatever. And so the alert was just badly 
worded. So the alert comes up and says, you know, ‘sepsis alert’ and 
what it means to say is ‘deteriorating patient alert, please go and use 
your excellent clinical judgement to decide if this is sepsis or some 
other cause of a deteriorating patient.’ … It’s that framing of it - 
makes them feel like their autonomy is being insulted basically. 
The sepsis alert had also been introduced in a way that ‘did not make 
sense’ in terms of routine work practices: 
… to be fair it’s really irritating because it keeps popping up and it’s 
very hard to get it in the right place in the workflow where it will pop 
up for people who need it and already know enough to answer the 
questions so in order to get it to pop up at all we have to pop it up 
before people know the answers which is irritating 
The non-clinical manager who had introduced the sepsis alert had 
not been sensitive to these political issues. In contrast, when Stephen 
introduced changes to working practices he was careful to do so in a way 
that did not make staff feel, ‘that they were being done to’. 
About three quarters of medical directors in the NHS retain some 
clinical commitments (Monitor 2014). Stephen did no clinical work but 
his professional status nonetheless continued to afford him legitimacy 
with the senior doctors in the hospital. This is illustrated in the following 
extract. Here again we see Stephen’s knowledge of professional norms 
and values, in this case doctors as clinical purists (Degeling et al., 2001): 
LJ: And does it help being a doctor? 
Stephen: With doctors? Yeah absolutely. It’s almost, it’s still with 
some of them, essential. They’re not going to listen to someone who’s 
not a doctor. And also they’ve got that higher purpose sort of trump 
card, so yeah I think in order to move them you do need to be a 
doctor. And they need to believe, and they don’t always, they need to 
believe that you’re on the side of the good guys and trying to do 
something sensible. 
Being a doctor helped Stephen to engage clinicians who had previous 
experience of multiple initiatives that had been abandoned, or replaced 
by something else, and as a result had become cynical or wary of 
becoming involved in further change initiatives. As Stephen explained 
during an interview: 
What the urgent care doctor was saying is ‘this is the sixth time in two 
years where I’ve been pulled out of the actual work to come to focus 
groups to put ‘post its’ on [mimes sticking a ‘post it note’ onto the 
wall]’ … you know. So some of it is just getting people to just hope, if 
you know what I mean, because they’re wary of, they’ve been let 
down before. 
Stephen saw his ability to influence clinicians throughout the orga-
nisation as key to his effectiveness in his role: 
There’s an element of trying to keep enough of them onside at any 
one time, because if you lose the consultant body you’re no longer 
effective. So that is an issue because traditionally they saw it as 
almost like a trade union rep and that’s certainly not how I see it … 
What is interesting about this data extract is that it suggests that the 
role of the Medical Director may have changed over time. Previous 
research on governing boards in the NHS represent doctors as rein-
forcing professional dominance and advancing the interests of their in-
dividual specialty (Addicott 2008). In contrast, we found that in 
organisations with a ‘high’ quality improvement maturity the medical 
directors exhibited a corporate orientation, focused on the goals of the 
organisation, and actively contributed to organisational strategy. In 
board meetings the Medical Director was visible and vocal, sitting, for 
example, next to the chair, and contributing throughout the meeting on 
a broad range of agenda items. Interview accounts also suggested that 
Medical Directors in these organisations had an interest and competence 
beyond their clinical area of expertise, in areas such as organisational 
transformation, financial performance, quality improvement, and 
workforce. In contrast, in organisations that we had rated as having a 
medium or low quality improvement maturity, where there was a 
Medical Director in post, they were less vocal during meetings, 
restricting their contribution to a more narrow clinical remit. 
Stephen was very much a ‘willing’ hybrid (McGivern et al., 2015), 
interested in general management, and an aspiring CEO. At the same 
time he retained a strong professional concern for clinical quality. His 
‘favourite part of the job’ was pursuing this through service redesign. In 
his day-to-day work he expressed sympathy for the experience of doctors 
in the organisation, whose departments had been affected by previous 
cost cutting exercises, and during meetings was often observed to ‘bal-
ance’ managerial perspectives from non-clinical executives with a 
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professional perspective. 
One way in which Stephen engaged other doctors in the organisation 
was through visual representations of data analysis. For example, he had 
introduced, for each specialty, a review of the service. Stephen showed 
the clinical leads for each specialty a report on their service containing 
tables and graphs that summarised the performance of their service on a 
range of measures, such as length of stay, income, market share and so 
forth, benchmarked against other organisations in the country. Ste-
phen’s approach was informed by an understanding of cultural traits, 
specifically a resistance to top-down performance management, but a 
willingness to engage with peer-led data analysis, especially its visual 
representation (Coleman et al., 2009). This approach had positive re-
sults in terms of the divisions subsequently working to improve their 
performance on these measures. 
In organisations with a ‘high’ quality improvement maturity, the 
work of medical directors was embedded in long-standing relationships 
and social networks across the region. For example, when they had 
meetings with regional NHS managers; external regulatory agencies; 
and other healthcare organisations, they were often with people they 
knew very well, often people who they had worked very closely with in 
previous roles. Indeed one day during fieldwork LJ stopped to chat to a 
regulator who was visiting the hospital for a meeting with Stephen. LJ 
had met the regulator earlier in the study, working closely with Stephen 
in a different guise. As Stephen observes below, good relationships 
across the region were an important antecedent for inter-organisational 
collaboration and cooperation, fostering trust and reducing conflict: 
I know both the [regional] Medical Directors reasonably well. I know 
[regional health education agency] well. All of those are important 
when there’s a problem in the sense that people pick up the phone 
instead of something […] I think they’re important in stopping 
problems escalating inappropriately and just sort of dampening, just 
keeping people calm until you can get to a sensible decision about 
what a problem is and isn’t. 
According to the lead for quality improvement, a good relationship 
with the commissioner had enabled Stephen to negotiate dedicated 
funding for quality improvement activity in the organisation. 
Stephen spent a lot of time maintaining relationships. For example, 
he would stay behind after board meetings to chat with the non- 
executive directors. His relationship with the director of nursing 
appeared friendly and supportive. In contrast, another medical director 
in the study, one that worked in an organisation that we rated as ‘me-
dium’ for quality improvement maturity (and was rated ‘requires 
improvement’ by the regulator), had poor relationships with other 
members of the board. In an interview, the Director of Human Resources 
referred to ‘a lack of connection’ between the Medical Director and the 
Director of Nursing that had stymied the development of the quality 
improvement strategy, a remit which was shared between the two 
clinical leaders. They also referred to a ‘difficult’ relationship with the 
Director of Operations: 
I think [Director of Operations] doesn’t feel as tightly joined to the 
Medical Director as he would like to. So there’s a few issues. And I 
think that shows, doesn’t it? It’s a bit like if the HR Director and the 
Medical Director don’t work, then you lose HR and recruitment and 
management, and if the HR Director and Ops Director can’t work 
together, you lose stuff again … So there are all sorts of relationships 
that need to work and the Medical Director and Ops Director is one. 
Another aspect of diplomatic work was public relations on behalf of 
the organisation. One location for this work was the board meeting. In 
the NHS in England boards meet in public. Most of the meetings LJ 
attended attracted only a few members of the public, perhaps one or 
two, together with individuals holding formal positions, such as gover-
nors, or representatives of the local Health Watch (a body with re-
sponsibility for democratic participation in healthcare planning). There 
were exceptions, such as when the board meeting was targeted as part of 
an organised community protest against organisational policies or plans 
(especially plans to close clinical facilities). At the end of board meetings 
there is time allocated for questions from members of the public. The 
response of board members to these questions varied. Some board 
members appeared uncomfortable, eager for the meeting to be drawn to 
a close, or else visibly irritated by particular individuals. The discomfort 
felt by some board members may stem from the marked juxtaposition, 
apparent at times, between the bureaucratic and administrative char-
acter of the main body of the meeting, and the often highly emotive 
character of the question and answer section, where questions may come 
from members of the public whose loved ones have experienced serious 
failings of care, or who may be angry about plans for change. During this 
part of the meeting Stephen appeared to listen attentively to questions, 
and in responding would acknowledge the veracity of accounts, adopt-
ing a collaborative tone (‘it’s a good idea actually’, ‘It’s an interesting 
point’, ‘I agree that it is something we could talk about’, ‘there is no 
reason why we couldn’t do that’), before setting out any action he would 
take in response. 
All the Medical Directors we observed in our study were heavily 
involved in regional healthcare planning, working on both the ‘front 
stage’ and ‘back stage’ (Degeling 1996). While planning on the front 
stage emphasises the values of rationality, objectivity, efficiency and full 
and open participation, planning on the back stage recognises the po-
litical dimensions of planning, the real world constraints, and the stra-
tegies and tactics of different actors. These include, ‘the selective use and 
release of information, agenda setting, mobilization of bias, and efforts 
by participants to build a coalition of support behind their specific in-
terests and concerns’ (Degeling 1996, p111). In our study an example of 
planning on the front stage was the work of regional clinical advisory 
groups, given the task, by regional executives, of producing rational 
plans for reorganising clinical services. Observing these meetings, it was 
clear that the Medical Directors who made up these committees were 
aware of their ‘discursive work’, on behalf of regional executives, in 
producing rational plans and communicating these to local clinicians 
and members of the public, often referring to themselves during dis-
cussions as being ‘on the stage’. 
The following is from an interview with Stephen and illustrates the 
activities of Medical Directors on the ‘back stage’ of healthcare planning. 
In the UK hospital closures are a politically contested issue, often the 
focus of ‘save our hospital’ campaigns from local community groups 
(Stewart 2019). In this case plans to close hospital facilities had been 
prepared by the organisation as part of financial assurance processes 
requested by a national regulator. According to Stephen, the plans were 
primarily for accounting purposes and were ‘never going to happen’, but 
following a report by a local newspaper, community groups had 
organised protests and, as it was in the run up to local elections, these 
were supported by local political leaders. In the following extract Ste-
phen is talking about subsequent informal meetings he had with local 
politicians: 
So we went to see the politicians and they said, “look, we understand 
what you are trying to do, there’s nothing wrong with the plan but 
you’ve blown your coms and until next April we’re going to save 
you”. 
This extract illustrates the use of informal channels of communica-
tion on the back stage of regional healthcare planning. It also suggests a 
recognition, among the actors, of the realpolitik of healthcare, and a 
mutual understanding of their respective roles. For the organisation this 
is to manage communication of controversial plans (‘you’ve blown your 
comms’), for local politicians it is to represent the interests of their 
constituents and to secure re-election (‘we’re going to save you’). 
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1.4. Repair work 
According to Stephen, much of his work involved repairing re-
lationships, between rank and file doctors and the hospital management, 
and between different organisations in the region. For example, within 
the hospital, relationships between managers and the clinical staff in the 
ophthalmology department had been damaged by previous cuts to the 
service, introduced by a team of management consultants before Ste-
phen had joined the organisation. Part of the Stephen’s work in service 
development was acknowledging previous trauma and rebuilding trust. 
He described the meetings he had with the doctors in the ophthalmology 
department as ‘mainly a therapy session’. 
Stephen also spent large amounts of time repairing relationships with 
external organisations that had been damaged by previous government 
reforms, such as the introduction of healthcare markets and provider 
competition, and structural reorganisations of clinical services. In one 
case his plans to collaborate with another organisation to provide more 
integrated care had been stymied by damage from the process of 
competitive tendering. In the following extract he describes how, in 
another case, he successfully repaired the relationship with a commis-
sioner that had been damaged by the process of contracting: 
When I got here [relationships] were very bad. They’d all fallen out 
over the contact which hadn’t got signed until the end of March of 
the year they were in. So part of my role, as I saw it, was to rebuild 
those relationships and have successively done that. 
In another example, Stephen wanted to introduce regional clinical 
networks. These are a collaborative way of providing a clinical service 
across a geographic region, by sharing rotas, or making joint appoint-
ments of medical staff. However relationships between the hospitals in 
the region had been damaged by what Stephen called ‘history’– mostly 
related to a series of organisational mergers and demergers. In the 
following extract Stephen recounts that he has spent ‘two or three years’ 
having meetings with another hospital in an effort to repair the rela-
tionship so that he can develop a region-wide network for surgery: 
that’s been … we’ve been going up and down, and it been looking 
much more hopeful recently, but it’s taken two or three years to sort 
these things out 
2. Discussion 
Our empirical focus on the day-to-day work of Medical Directors 
contributes to an understanding of the role of medical leaders in 
healthcare governance. We suggest that the ‘translation work’, ‘diplo-
matic work’ and ‘repair work’ of Medical Directors improves the quality 
of services by enhancing the absorptive capacity of the organisation. 
Absorptive capacity describes an organisation’s ‘ability to identify, 
assimilate, and exploit knowledge from the environment’ (Cohen et al., 
1990). According to Currie et al. (2019) absorptive capacity relies on 
members of an organisation with skills that can help to bridge complex 
social systems. These include skills in formal knowledge exchange 
mechanisms and knowledge of environmental incentives that shape 
priorities; cultural mechanisms that promote a shared way of doing 
things and collective interpretations of reality within organisations; and 
coordination and liaison skills. While formal knowledge exchange has 
been the focus of an extensive literature (Rycroft-Malone 2004; Graham 
et al., 2006), less attention has been paid to the political and emotional 
dimensions of healthcare organisations and the diplomatic and repair 
work necessary for quality improvement. For example, establishing and 
maintaining relationships enables Medical Directors to identify in-
novations in external networks, while their knowledge of the cultures 
and routines within their organisation enable them to translate these 
into practice. 
Most of our findings relate to the category of ‘diplomatic work’, 
reflecting the inherently political nature of public-sector policy imple-
mentation, service change, and quality improvement (Langley and Denis 
2011), and the essentially relational nature of clinical leadership in 
healthcare organisation (Fitzgerald et al., 2013). Fitzgerald et al. found 
that a foundation of good pre-existing relationships was key to the 
ability of clinical leaders to deliver service improvements. Conversely, 
poor relationships eroded the capacity of organisations to improve care. 
Our findings suggest that in publicly funded healthcare systems the work 
of the Medical Director in healthcare governance involves four key 
forms of connection and interaction, (1) board dynamics, (2) relation-
ships with clinicians within the organisation, (3) relationships with 
other health and social care organisations in the region that underpin 
‘collaborative governance’ (Ansell and Gash 2008), and (4) relationships 
with external stakeholders that make up the ‘authorising environment’ 
(Moore 1994), namely regulatory, policy, and public stakeholders. 
Our study highlights the fact that changes to clinical services can 
leave a long emotional shadow. Much of the research on organisational 
change in healthcare has tended to focus on clinical outcomes, or adopt 
technical models of implementation that neglect the social and 
emotional consequences (Jones et al., 2019; Boaz et al., 2016). Our 
study therefore complements existing studies of organisational change 
in healthcare by foregrounding the experiences of loss and change, and 
the work of attending to emotions such as anger. Shadowing a Medical 
Director revealed that they spent a significant amount of time repairing 
relationships that had been damaged by previous government policies, 
such as the introduction of provider competition, and large-scale 
structural reorganisations of clinical services. ‘Disruption’ often has a 
positive valence in policy debate. Our study contributes to the evidence 
for the potential negative effects of repeated cycles of structural change, 
on service development, patient care, and outcomes (Fulop et al., 2005; 
Clack et al., 2018; Vaughn et al., 2019). 
Although organisational change may be seen by staff as an oppor-
tunity, and stimulate positive emotions such as excitement, it is more 
often experienced as threatening, stimulating feelings such as anger, 
fear, anxiety, cynicism, resentment and withdrawal (Küpers and Weibler 
2008). In addition to impacting on staff wellbeing and motivation, 
negative emotions can hinder learning, team work, innovation, and 
creative problem solving. According to Küpers and Weibler: ‘the 
decreased performance, climate of distrust, stifled innovation and 
reduced creativity render the organisation passive and debilitated, 
undermining the best intentions of change initiatives, as well as incur-
ring significant costs’ (2008, p256). 
Our findings also provide for a more nuanced understanding of 
professional ‘resistance’ to organisational change, showing how this 
may stem not just from vested interests, but from initiative fatigue and 
distrust borne from previous experience of change initiatives that were 
abandoned or replaced by ‘the next thing’. 
Our analysis suggests areas for theoretical refinement. Waring’s 
(2014) development of Friedson’s theory of professional restratification 
is conceptual, requiring empirical testing. Drawing from our research we 
make the following observations that suggest areas for further research 
and conceptual development. 
First, the focus of Waring’s (2014) analysis is on the relations be-
tween professional elites. This analysis implicitly assumes that elite roles 
are occupied by different individuals. However, we found that the work 
of the Medical Director encompassed a number of different categories - 
‘managerial elites’, as originally suggested by Waring, but also ‘political 
elites’ and ‘corporate elites’. As responsible officer (RO) for professional 
revalidation they can also be understood as a ‘governance elite’ (Bryce 
et al., 2018). Like Waring (2014), Bryce et al. make connections with the 
governmentality literature. They argue that, as governance elites, 
Medical Directors primarily advance external agendas: 
… the function of ROs is not one which primarily acts in defence of 
professional autonomy. Rather, ROs’ work, and their attitudes to-
wards fulfilling their core task of monitoring other doctors’ fitness to 
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practise, seem likely to expand professional regulation into the 
organisational sphere in new ways (2018, p104). 
Second, while Waring’s category of ‘political elites’ describes those 
operating at the national-level, and in formal policy institutions and 
processes, our study draws attention to the role that Medical Directors 
play in regional-level healthcare politics, and to informal channels of 
communication. In their study of regional healthcare politics, Jones and 
Exworthy (2015) found that Medical Directors played a key role in the 
rhetorical strategies of local organisations seeking to introduce contro-
versial changes to services. They caution that, to the extent that these 
strategies are recognised by other stakeholders, and perceived to be 
manipulative, they may ‘backfire’ by eroding trust. Similarly, Jones 
(1999), in an earlier study of healthcare planning in London, highlights 
the discursive work of clinical advisory groups, describing these as a 
series of meetings that were ‘less a means of arriving at a set of 
healthcare decisions and more a means of legitimising decisions that 
had, more or less, already been taken’ (1999, p94). In our study the 
Medical Directors on clinical advisory groups appeared to act in good 
faith in preparing plans for the rational reorganisation of clinical ser-
vices across the region, but were, at the same time, aware of the 
discursive dimension of their work. 
Third, as a member of the board of a healthcare organisation, Med-
ical Directors also occupy an elevated position as a ‘corporate elite’. 
Waring’s analysis of corporate elites is in the context of private sector 
organisations, and in relation to wider capital markets. He suggests, for 
example, that doctors on the executive boards of large healthcare or-
ganisations ‘are encouraged to align with the interests of shareholders at 
the expense of their commitment to the wider profession’ (2014, p700). 
Our study enables us to consider how this category translates to a 
publicly funded healthcare system such as the NHS. We found that in 
contrast to previous research on boards in the NHS which positioned 
Medical Directors as aligned with the interests of their clinical speciality, 
Medical Directors in organisations with a ‘high’ quality improvement 
maturity aligned with the goals of the organisation. In the NHS in En-
gland these goals are related to organisational survival in a turbulent, 
resource constrained and policy dependent context, and typically 
include cost control, acquisition of additional resources, meeting regu-
latory requirements, and implementing national government policy. In 
Waring’s analysis corporate elites are able to benefit personally, through 
ownership and partnerships in profit-making organisations. Similar 
opportunities are available in the mixed economy of provision in the 
NHS. Membership of NHS hospital boards also offers the opportunity to 
benefit personally through further promotion - by the end of fieldwork 
more than one Medical Director in our study had moved on to a higher 
position in the NHS hierarchy. 
A key finding from our study is that in organisations with a ‘high’ 
quality improvement maturity Medical Directors were orientated to the 
goals of the organisation, actively contributing to organisational strat-
egy, and representing the organisation in dialogue with external stake-
holders. In contrast to previous studies of Medical Directors (McGivern 
et al., 2015), and doctors who have taken up roles as chief executives 
(Ham et al., 2011) our focus was not on career narratives or professional 
identity, but on activities and interaction and on what was being 
accomplished in day-to-day work. From our data it was unclear to what 
extent our findings can be interpreted as representing a modern ‘hybrid 
professionalism’ (McGivern et al., 2015). It does, however, suggest a 
break with what Kirkpatrick et al. (2016) refer to as ‘defensive profes-
sionalism’, at least in some organisations. This shift might be seen as 
offering a beneficial corrective to vested interests and professional 
intransigence. Alternatively, it may reflect a naturalisation of manage-
rial values and organisational priorities at the expense of patient in-
terests. In close observation of his day-to-day work, Stephen was often 
seen to ‘balance’ managerial and professional perspectives. Recent 
scholarship has revisited the role of professionalism in enhancing high 
quality healthcare in systems dominated by managerial logics (Martin 
et al., 2015). It might be that an important way that Medical Directors, 
in their hybrid role, may enhance the quality of services provided by an 
organisation is through balancing professional and managerial logics. 
More research is needed to explore what are likely to be complex and 
varied consequences of corporate elites for patient advocacy, patient 
voice and patient interests in healthcare organisations. 
Our research contributes to a gap in the literature on medical- 
manager hybrids at the level of the board, and their role in policy 
implementation, service change, and quality improvement. We have 
also suggested areas for theoretical development in the sociology of the 
professions. Our study is, however, exploratory. The analytical cate-
gories of ‘diplomatic work’ and ‘repair work’ were generated from 
shadowing a single individual from an organisation with a ‘high’ quality 
improvement maturity, although we nuanced and strengthened our 
analysis through comparisons within a larger data set, comparisons with 
other empirical studies, and member validation. We therefore recom-
mend more ethnographic research, from different contexts, that ‘fol-
lows’ the Medical Director through interactions with different actors 
and across different governance arenas (Marcus 1995). 
3. Conclusion 
In high performing organisations Medical Directors undertake 
‘translation work’, ‘diplomatic work’, and ‘repair work’, which con-
tributes to the governance of quality within healthcare organisations, 
and to broader forms of system-wide governance. Enabled by their 
hybrid role, these forms of work constitute important mechanisms for 
the relationship between medical leaders and the quality of healthcare 
services. 
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